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RECENT CASES
INSURANCE: Liability of Insurer to Insured in Excess of Face
Value of Policy for Failure to Settle after a Reasonable Time.-Plain-
tiff hospital was insured by defendant up to $50,000 for injuries to pa-
tients caused by the negligence of plaintiff's employees. In suit against
hospital by an injured patient, defendant delayed negotiating a pos-
sible settlement within policy coverage, until the offer to settle was
withdrawn just prior to trial. At the trial, the jury found verdict
against the hospital for $100,000, which was double the face amount
of the policy. The hospital now sues the insurer to recover full
amount of previous judgment. HELD: for plaintiff. Defendant
insurance company was guilty of bad faith in refusing to settle for
reasonable sum when opportunity was presented. Vanderbilt Uni-
versity v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 109 F. Supp. 565
(M. D. Tenn. 1952).
The rule generally followed throughout the United States is that
a liability insurer has absolute authority to settle claims within policy
limits, but the insured has no power either to compel or prevent
settlements. Best Building Co. v. Employer's Liability Assurance
Corp., 247 N. Y. 451, 160 N. E. 911 (1928) ; Long v. Union Ind.
Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N. E. 737 (1931); Foremost Dairies v.
Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 500, 196 S. R. 279 (1938). The
mere refusal of an insurer to settle a claim for an amount within
the policy limits does not, of itself, render the insurer liable for a
subsequent judgment which exceeds policy limits. Wynnewood Lunz-
ber Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 173 N. C. 269, 91 S. . 946 (1917).
But, if the insurer refuses to settle unless insured does something not
,required in the insurance contract, e. g. pay part of the proposed
settlement, insurer may be liable for the entire excess judgment.
Brown & McCabe v. Guarantee & Accident Co., 232 Fed. 298 (D.
Oreg. 1915). All cases acknowledge a liability for fraudulent con-
duct or bad faith in the insurer's refusing to settle. Tiger River
Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 163 S. C. 229, 161 S. E. 491
(1931); Douglas v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 81
N. H. 371, 127 Atl. 708 (1924). The basic disagreement occurs
as to whether to allow negligence to be added as a further ground
for recovery. The older rule, which now appears to be losing favor,
is that the insured may recover only if insurer acted fraudulently or
in bad faith. Georgia Casualty Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S. W.
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2d 777 (1932). Difficulty arises in the divergent definitions of "bad
faith": dishonesty, Noshey v. American Automobile Insurance Co.,
68 F. 2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934) ; arbitrary refusal, Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F. 2d 616 (8th Cir. 1934) ; disregard of
insured's interests, Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 109
Vt. 481, 1 A. 2d 817 (1938); and lack of reasonable diligence in
learning facts on which the decision not to settle is based. Hilker v.
Western Automobile Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 235 N. W. 413 (1931).
This last definition of "bad faith" would appear to encompass the
negligence rule.
The second view, the rule of negligence, with which South Caro-
lina is in accord, includes fraud and bad faith and adds the further
ground of negligence. Since a liability insurer has absolute control
over any negotiations for settlements, the insurer will be held to the
exercise of that degree of care which a man of ordinary prudence
should exercise in the management of his own business. Hilker v.
Western Automobile Ins. Co., supra. An insurer's delay in acting
on a compromise offer until offer is withdrawn is evidence of negli-
gence. Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170 S. C.
286, 170 S. E. 346 (1933). However, if insurer did not fail to use
reasonable care and prudence in declining a settlement, there is no
liability to the insured. Blue Bird Taxi Corp. v. American Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 26 F. Supp. 808 (R. D. S. C. 1939). Generally,
the question of insurer's bad faith or negligence in handling the settle-
ment is for the jury. Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty
Co., supra. The basic difference between the two rules seems to be
one of defining the responsibility of the insurer to the insured. Under
the bad faith rule, the insurance company has a two-fold relation-
ship: one, as insurer; two, as agent for the insured. Georgia Casualty
Co. v. Mann, supra. The insurance company may look at its own
interests as well as those of the insured, and what would be con-
sidered a compromise from the insured's standpoint might not be a
compromise from the insurer's standpoint. The South Carolina
Supreme Court has expressly repudiated this view and, in following
the rule of negligence, has held that an insurer, in assuming the duty
of defending a claim, owes the assured the duty of settling the claim
if that is the reasonable thing to do. If the insurer negligently makes
no serious attempt to settle until matters are in such shape that the
claim cannot be settled as advantageously to the assured as formerly,
the assured may recover his loss so occasioned by suing in tort for
negligence, or for breach of implied contract to exercise reasonable
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care in conducting the suit. If the interests of insurer and insured
are in conflict, the insurer is bound to sacrifice its interests in favor
of the insured's. Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
supra.
The principal case would undoubtedly be sound in all jurisdic-
tions; there was clearly bad faith, although not shown here, on the
part of the insurer, hence no need to look further for applying the
negligence rule. In South Carolina and apparently the growing
majority of states, not only bad faith, but failure on the part of the
insurer to settle, if it is the reasonable thing to do, will make the
insurer liable to the insured for a judgment in excess of the face
amount of the policy. Under the rule of negligence the insurer is
held to stricter responsibility for protecting the insured's interests.
More than an equal consideration of the insurer's and insured's in-
terests is required; under the rule of bad faith, equal consideration
is all that need be given.
HARVEY L. GOLDEN.
DAMAGES: Recovery for Mental Suffering for Damage to Prop-
erty.-The defendant corporation, operating a cemetery, sold through
mistake a portion of plaintiff's lot to strangers who used this space
to bury two bodies. Prior to the sale of a part of plaintiff's cemetery
lot, plaintiff had used three spaces for graves of her foster parents
and foster uncle. After the mistake had been brought to its atten-
tion, defendant offered to pay plaintiff for portion which was sold
to strangers or move the bodies of the strangers to a new lot, but
plaintiff refused to consent. Lower court allowed recovery for actual
damages, but trial judge granted motion for new trial solely on
ground that mental suffering was not an element of actual damages.
On appeal, HELD: reversed. Mental suffering or mental anguish
suffered by plaintiff as a result of re-sale of lot and burial therein of
strangers was an element of actual damages recoverable by plaintiff
from such corporation, and plaintiff was not required to show defen-
dant's wilfulness, wantoness, or maliciousness in order to recover for
mental suffering or mental anguish. Lanford v. West Oakwood
Cemetery Addition, Inc., 75 S. E. 2d 865 (S. C. 1953).
Generally, there can be no recovery for mental anguish suffered by
a plaintiff in connection with an injury to his property. B. F. Good-
rich Co. v. Hughes, 239 Ala. 373, 194 So. 842 (1940); Stovall v.
[Vol. 6
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Caverly, 139 Ga. 243, 77 S. E. 29 (1913). If, however, the act oc-
casioning the injury to the property is inspired by fraud, malice, or
like motives equivalent to an intentional tort, mental suffering is a
proper element of damages. Sager v. Sisters of Mercy of Colorado,
81 Colo. 498, 256 Pac. 8 (1927) ; Pollard v. Phelps, 56 Ga. App. 408,
193 S. E. 102 (1937). In cases involving desecration of graves
where the injury was wanton, malicious, or equivalent to a reckless
disregard of the rights of the plaintiff, damages for mental anguish
may be recovered, and in estimating such damages the injury to the
natural feelings of the plaintiff may be taken into consideration.
Jacobus v. Congregation of Children of Israel, 107 Ga. 518, 33 S. E.
853 (1899); Meager v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, 96 Am. Dec. 759
(1868). Although there are no previous South Carolina cases direct-
ly involving the question of re-selling a portion of a cemetery lot to
strangers, it has been established that no recovery can be had for
damages for mental suffering in the absence of bodily injury, except
under the mental anguish statutes with reference to telegraph com-
panies, Norris v. Southern Railway, 84 S. C. 15, 65 S. R. 956
(1909); Shepard v. Southern Railway, 135 S. C. 75, 133 S. E. 231
(1924), and the situation where a carrier was held liable for mental
suffering inflicted upon a passenger by conductor who wrongfully
used insulting language to passenger, although there was no bodily
injury. Lipman v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 108 S. C. 151,
93 S. E. 713 (1916). Recovery for mental anguish in absence of
bodily injury was expressly denied where defendant had increased
the height of a dam causing the water to be poisoned and polluted
which resulted in death of plaintiff's cows drinking therefrom. Henry
v. Southern Railway, 93 S. C. 125, 75 S. E. 1018 (1911). A Georgia
case, however, allowed punitive damages for mental suffering where
the defendant had trespassed and buried a member of his family on
plaintiff's cemetery lot which was not deeded but only set-off to
plaintiff by the church owning the land. Hale v. Hale, 199 Ga. 150,
33 S. E. 2d 441 (1945). Not directly in point but by analogy, it
has been held that it is the right and duty of the living to bury their
dead and to:
• . . give the remains Christian and decent interment without in-
terference from any one, and no argument or sophistry can con-
vince that in a Christian country the dead body of a person is
entitled to no more consideration and protection than an article
of merchandise.
1953]
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Osteen v. Southern Railway, 101 S. C. 532, 86 S. E. 30 (1915).
Where defendant without permission deliberately broke open vault
and removed the casket therefrom, it was held that the real basis of
the injury was the violation of the feelings of the living by the in-
dignity to the dead, rather than an invasion of the right of property.
Hamilton v. Individual Mausoleum Co., 149 Kan. 216, 86 P. 2d
501 (1939). Mental pain and suffering in connection with a wrong,
which apart from such pain and suffering constitutes a cause of
action, is a proper element of actual damages where it is the natural
and proximate consequence of the wrong; and where such damages
are allowed, it is an element of compensatory as distinguished, from
exemplary damages. Shuter v. Heitley, 209 S. C. 198, 39 S. E. 2d
360 (1946).
The problem involved in the principal case is one of first impres-
sion in South Carolina, and the result conforms generally to the
line of cases allowing recovery for trespass to cemetery lots, destruc-
tion of graves, and desecration of dead bodies. Ordinarily there can
be no recovery for mental suffering for damages to real property in
the absence of malice or fraud, but it appears that cemetery lots,
graves, and dead bodies are classified as a hallowed or special type
of property which the courts are prone to protect. In the instant
case, the cemetery lot where close relatives were buried was said
to occupy an entirely different status from that of any other plot
or piece of land which one could own and was considered as hallowed
land. As a result, the court did not even consider the cases dealing
with property in general, but adopted the theory set out in Shuler V.
Heitley, supra, and allowed recovery for mental anguish which was
said to be the natural and proximate consequence of the wrong com-
mitted by the defendant. From the facts, the decision appears
sound since it is in conformity with the modern trend toward allow-
ing recovery for mental anguish where conscience dictates it, even
in the absence of bodily injury.
G. Ross ANDERSON, JR.
TORTS: Civil Action - Intent to Inflict Injury as Element. -
Plaintiff, defendant's warehouse manager, was accused by the de-
fendant's auditor of being short certain property. The plaintiff was
discharged by the auditor who then grasped the plaintiff's arm in
an angry manner and demanded the keys to the warehouse. The
plaintiff brought action for libel and slander and civil assault and
[Vol. 6
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battery. The lower court held for defendant. On appeal, HELD:
reversed. The trial judge, in charging that the intent to inflict in-
jury is a necessary element in a civil action of assault and battery,
committed. prejuditial error. Herring v. Lawrence Warehouse Co.,
222 S. C. 226, 72 S. E. 2d 453 (1952).
Although there is some authority that an intent to inflict injury
is not a necessary element to the maintenance of a civil action of
assault and battery, Seigel v. Long, 169 Ala. 79, 53 So. 753 (1910)
-Alabama has repeatedly followed this doctrine-, it is gener-
ally held that such intent is a necessary element. Perkins v. Stein,
94 Ky. 433, 22 S. W. 649 (1893); Ott v. Great Northern Ry. Co.,
70 Minn. 50, 72 N. W. 833 (1879) ; Biggins v. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry.
Co., 102 Tex. 417, 118 S. W. 125 (1901). Thus in Donner v. Graap,
134 Wis. 523, 115 N. W. 125 (1908), the court held that the action
for battery is founded upon an intentionally administered injury.
There is, however, a well-recognized exception to the general rule,
and that is where the defendant is engaged in the performance of
an otherwise unlawful or wrongful act. Richmond v. Fiske, 160
Mass. 34, 35 N. E. 103 (1893) ; Lutterman v. Romey, 143 Iowa 233,
121 N. W. 1040 (1909) ; Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N. W.
403 (1891). In the latter instance, the courts generally hold that
the intention is immaterial since the intention to commit the unlaw-
ful or wrongful act is sufficient. Paxton v. Boyer, 67 Ill. 132, 16
Am. Rep. 615 (1873); Brabazon v. Joannes Bros. Co., 231 Wis.
426, 286 N. W. 21 (1939); Fort Wayne & Northern Traction Co.
v. Ridenour, 71 Ind. App. 263, 123 N. E. 720 (1919). Also recovery
is generally allowed in those cases where the defendant acts with a
reckless disregard of consequences as such conduct is usually con-
strued to constitute constructive intent to do injury. Reynolds v.
Pierson, 29 Ind. App. 273, 64 N. E. 484 (1902). Some courts have
even gone so far as to infer the intention to inflict injury from negli-
gence, Lentine v. McAvoy, 105 Conn. 528, 136 Atl. 76 (1927). How-
ever, this view is not generally accepted, Newman v. Christensen,
149 Neb. 471, 31 N. W. 2d 417 (1948), where the court held that
an action for assault and battery is not an action for negligence;
the former is intentional, the latter unintentional.
An intent to inflict injury is generally held to be an essential
element to the maintenance of a civil action for assault and battery
unless the defendant was engaged in the performance of an other-
wise unlawful or wrongful act. This is the better rule since, if it
were otherwise, every careless act by a person that resulted in an
1953]
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unprivileged contact with another would be an assault and battery.
In the instant case the court stated: "The rule, supported by the
weight of authority, is that the defendant's intention does not enter
into the case, for, if reasonable fear of bodily harm has been caused
by the conduct of the defendant, this is an assault." If taken liter-
ally, this would seem to eliminate completely any necessity in South
Carolina for showing an intention to inflict injury, but it is doubtful
that this statement should be extended beyond the facts in this case
-where the defendant undoubtedly did act intentionally. This
caveat is justified by the court's subsequent citing of 4 American
Jurisprudence, Section 5, page 128, wherein the immateriality of in-
tent was reiterated, but with the very significant proviso that the
act causing the injury must have been wrongful, which is the well-
recognized exception to the general rule. Thus it would seem that
the court, in the instant case, did not abandon intent as an essential
element in a civil action for assault and battery.
M. A. McAISThR.
INSURANCE -LOAN RECEIPT ARRANGEMENT: Does a
Loan Receipt Arrangement Constitute Loan or Payment?-Insurer
effected loan receipt agreement with insured. In suit by insured, the
defendant third party tortfeasor alleged insurer was real party in
interest. Lower court held that plaintiffs should amend their com-
plaints to show that suit was brought for use and benefit of insurer.
On appeal, HELD: reversed. *Where insurer paid loss of insured
persons, and those insured executed loan receipt agreement and
brought action against third party tortfeasor, insurer was not the
real party in interest and therefore not a necessary party. Gould v.
Weibel, 62 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1952).
A loan receipt is an instrumentality which permits .an insurer to
pay an insured speedily and yet press in court to recoup its losses
without the insurer appearing by name, thereby avoiding some of the
consequences of subrogation. Klukus v. Young, 121 Ind. 160, 98
N. E. 2d 227 (1951). The majority of the courts treat the loan
receipt arrangement as a loan rather than a payment. In the leading
case, Luckenbach v. W. I. McCahan Sugar Refining Co., 248 U. S.
139 (1918), the insured's cargo of sugar en route from Puerto Rico
to Philadelphia was damaged severely because of the unseaworthi-
ness of the ship. The insured and the insurer entered into an agree-
[Vol. 6
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ment whereby the insurers would adjust the loss by advancing money
to the insured, repayable in the event of a recovery by the insured in
a suit against the carrier. The court held this advance was a loan
rather than a payment and, therefore, the insurer was an unnecessary
party to the action as it was not the real party in interest. The lead-
ing South Carolina cases hold that where an insured was injured
in an accident and entered into a loan receipt agreement with the in-
surer, the insured is the real party in interest, since the money given to
the insured is a loan and not a payment. Phillips v. Clifton Mfg. Co.,
204 S. C. 496, 30 S. E. 2d 146, 157 A.L.R. 1255 (1944) ; Brown v.
Smiti, 210 S. C. 405, 42 S. E. 2d 883 (1947). In McCann v. Dixie
Lake & Realty Co., 44 Ga. App. 700, 162 S. R. 869 (1932), where
the insured had received partial compensation from the insurer for
jewelry which was checked with the defendant's agent and subse-
quently lost, the defendant was held liable for the full value and
not the difference between the partial compensation and full value.
A similar result was reached in S himan Bros. & Co. v. Nebraska
National Hotel Co., 143 Neb. 404, 9 N. W. 2d 807 (1943), where
the wholesale value of stolen jewelry was the amount the insurer
had advanced to the insured; the court held that the market value
could be recovered. If the insured and the insurer thought their in-
terest would be best served by making a loan, they have a right to
make such an agreement. Newco Land Co. v. Martin, 358 Mo. 99,
213 S. W. 2d 504 (1948). The execution of loan receipt agree-
ments does not result in a defect in party plaintiff and the action
need not be brought in the name of the insurance company. Eber
Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Fireman's Insurance Co. of Newark,
30 F. Supp. 412 (1939). There is a difference of opinion among the
various departments of the Appellate Division in New York. Some
of the departments take the view that where the insurer paid insured
a sum representing damages to automobile and insured executed
loan receipt agreement, such transaction was not a loan and to so
designate it in pleading was a fiction and sham. Purdy v. McGarity,
262 App. Div. 623, 30 N. Y. Supp. 2d 966 (1941) ; Scarborough v.
Batholomew, 263 App. Div. 765, 30 N. Y. Supp. 2d 971 (1941). The
theory followed by these New York courts is that there can be
no loan unless the borrower agrees to repay absolutely. Yezek
v. Delaware L. & W. R. R., 176 Misc. 553, 28 N. Y. Supp. 2d 35
(1941). However, other departments in the Appellate Division hold
that the advance is a loan and not a payment. Ash v. Rhodes, 5 N. Y.
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Supp. 2d 939 (1938); Humphrey v. Gawehn, 36 N. Y. Supp. 2d 620
(1942).
While the majority of the courts treat the advances by the insurer
as loans, the word loan is perhaps a misnomer. In the loan receipt
agreement there is never any provision for the absolute repayment
of the advance, nor is there ever any provision for the payment of
interest. As far as the insured is concerned the money is his and
he need never worry about repaying a like amount to the insurer.
However, the advantages, both to the insured and to the insurer, of
these advances warrant their use. It assures prompt payment to the
insured and saves the insurer from juries which are often preju-
diced against insurance companies. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in his
opinion in the Luckenbach case, supra, says: "It is creditable to
the ingenuity of businessmen that an arrangement should have been
devised which is consonant both with the needs of commerce and the
demands of justice."
F. HAMPTON ALvY.
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